SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
         CAMDEN COUNTY
         CAMDEN COUNTY HALL OF JUSTICE
         5th Street and Mickle Boulevard
         Camden, New Jersey 06103-4001

         Chambers of
         Vincent D. Segal, Judge

         October 14, 1992

         Carol Oswald, Esquire           John T. Kubit, Esquire
         TEICH, GROH & FROST             P.O. Box 1386
         691 State Highway 33            Mt. Laurel, NJ 08054
         Mercerville
         Trenton, NJ 08619-4492

         RE:  FRED TAHAN v. MICHELLE (TAHAN) DUQUETTE
              FM-18356-88

         Dear Counsel:

         The issue that remains to be decided by this court is the amount
         of counsel fees, if any, to be awarded in favor of defendant and
         against plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. 11607(b). In the opinion
         of this court the issue should be decided first on the basis of
         whether or not defendant is entitled to counsel fees and secondly
         on the basis of the ability of plaintiff to pay counsel fees.

         Subsection (3) of Section 11607(b) of the Federal Statute
         provides:

              Any court ordering the return of a child pursuant to an
              action  brought  under  Section  4  shall   order   the
              respondent  to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on
              behalf of the petitioner, including court costs,  legal
              fees,  foster  care  or other care during the course of
              proceedings in the  action,  and  transportation  costs
              related  to  the  return  of  the  child,   unless  the
              respondent establishes that such order would be clearly
              inappropriate.

         Plaintiff concludes from the foregoing language that the award of
         counsel fees is therefore not compulsory but discretionary. In
         this vein plaintiff argues the following:

              1.    The original breach of any court order was the breach
                    committed by defendant by failing to return the child
                    to New Jersey pursuant to the original New Jersey Court
                    order.

              2.    Plaintiff has substantial counsel fees of his own (over
                    $34,000 owed or paid to New Jersey counsel and
                    significant fees yet to be incurred in the ongoing
                    Canadian litigation).

              3.    Plaintiff's income is such as not to permit the
                    satisfaction of a counsel fee award.

         Defendant asserts that counsel fees are permissible under the
         Hague Convention but under the Federal Statute enacted by Congress
         the award of counsel fees is mandatory. Defendant relies upon the
         statute and in particular the mandatory directive, "shall". But
         defendant clearly by advancing this argument ignores the last
         phrase in this section of the Federal Statute that provides that
         counsel fees are to be awarded "unless the respondent establishes
         that such order would be clearly inappropriate."

         Based on reading of the statute it appears that the award of
         counsel fees while favored is not mandatory.  Some discretion is
         left to the court if the award is inappropriate. In this context
         the court finds:

              (a)   The counsel fees incurred by defendant in these
                    proceedings total $11,134.48.

              (b)   The counsel fees requested are not unreasonable given
                    the appearances before this court as well as two
                    appearances before the appellate division.

              (c)   It was absolutely necessary for defendant to retain
                    counsel in order to enforce her rights under the
                    determination made by the Canadian Courts as well as
                    the provisions of the Federal statute and the Hague
                    Convention.

              (d)   The procedural facts placed plaintiff in violation of a
                    Canadian Court Order as found by the Appellate Division
                    in its first Opinion.

              (e)   Defendant's annual earnings approximate $20,000 (1991
                    figures).

              (f)   Plaintiff's annual earnings approximate $52,500 (1991
                    figures).

              (g)   Plaintiff's projected earnings in 1992 are
                    approximately $63,000 to $64,000 based upon the Case
                    Information Statement submitted.

              (h)   Plaintiff in addition to providing for himself provides
                    for his spouse and a child born of that relationship.*

              (i)   Defendant appears only to be responsible for the
                    support of herself.*

         Given the foregoing, counsel fees are awarded in favor of
         defendant and against plaintiff in the amount of $7,500. A
         Judgment is entered in favor of Mr. Kubit and against plaintiff in
         this amount. In making an award of $7,500 the Court has taken into
         consideration the respective financial positions of the parties,
         the responsibilities each party has for themselves as well as
         others, the necessity of the services rendered and the
         reasonableness of the fee requested. Such an Order in the opinion
         of this Court is not inappropriate.

         Mr. Kubit, please submit the appropriate form of Order.

         Very truly yours,

         /s/ V. Segal

         VINCENT D. SEGAL, J.S.C.

         *The Court is not considering support for Kareem who has been the
         subject of the ongoing litigation. It is presumed that when the
         parties finally end the custody dispute an appropriate support
         Order will be fashioned.